(JOINED IN PROGRESS)
CAPTAIN JEFF DAVIS: -- your comments.
BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES H. CLEVELAND: Thank you very much, Jeff.
And good morning to everybody. I want to thank you all once again for taking the time. I know that there's an awful lot going on, so I am appreciative of it.
What I would really like to do again today is similar to last week. I want to be able to provide a couple of opening comments and hit on one specific topic. And then open it up to your questions. And I certainly do welcome them, and we'll spend as much time as you need.
Since the release of the 15-6 about a week or so ago, our headquarters has actually received an awful lot of questions about, again, what is the mission and what are U.S. troops doing over here, and what are the roles. And so while I think some of you already know this, I just want to reestablish the baseline and talk about the mission that U.S. soldiers are doing.
And specifically, there's two missions. Right now, we are conducting the first mission, which is a train, advise and assist mission, that is nested and is a part of a much larger NATO train, advise and assist mission. The second mission, again as we discussed last time, is the unilateral U.S. counterterrorism mission.
But starting with the train, advise and assist mission, the real purpose of it is to help the Afghans build a sustainable security capability. And we want it to be enduring. So it's not just about winning a battle tonight or it's not just about winning the battle next month. What we want to be able to do is have this capability that's enduring through this year, through next year and through the future years.
And ultimately, what we want the Afghans to be able to do is be able to defend their own territory, number one. And then number two, be able to address these transnational and trans-regional terrorist organizations that oftentimes will base in this region and then try and strike the West.
So, it really is what it sounds like. It's a train, advise and assist. On the training side, we actually do have NATO and NATO partner nation people out physically doing hands-on training. That's everything from how to fire weapons, how to fly an aircraft, how to call for fire -- those types of things. The training does occur here in Afghanistan, but it also occurs in Europe. And then in some instances, it occurs back in the United States.
The advise piece is really having the coalition be able to put people into specific locations within the ANDSF and have them provide that specific advice: Okay, we have been down the following path before; I see you're about to make this decision; perhaps you ought to consider the following factors.
And so there is an advise aspect to it.
And then the assistance aspect of it really does come in the form of either financial support or material support. And that can be as large as aircraft, as we talked last time, some of the A-29s, the ND-530s, those types of things. And it can go all the way down really to small arms capability and other types of capabilities out there.
So it really comes in three forms for the coalition as well. We conduct this TAA mission at the ministerial level; then at an operational corps and then police zone level; and then finally we execute it at the tactical level.
So at the ministerial level, what we've been able to do is embed advisers into both the ministry of interior and the ministry of defense here in Kabul. And so what we're trying to assist them with is the institutional work to really work on human resources and operations and intelligence and logistics, and to really set up the institution, because it's our view that if you can't man, train, equip and then employ your force, then at the end of the day you're really not going to have a security institution.
The second level, again, is the corps or police zone level. And one is -- the corps, of course, are with the MOD, the police zones with the MOI. And what we're trying to do with that is the corps serve as that tire, that bridge between the strategic-level intent, as well as the strategic-level resourcing, and the actual tactical fight.
So at the corps level, what we're trying to do is help them be able to maneuver large formations, and then also be able to look out across multiple provinces, identify threats, commit parts of their force to address that threat, be able to commit and employ low-density assets and capabilities.
But we also want them to be able to do the operational logistics side as well, be able to forecast how much ammunition they're going to need, forecast how much fuel they're going to need, and then be able to move those types of things to and from their troops.
We're currently doing this at four permanent locations -- and again, when I say "we," this is the larger NATO mission. But we're doing it at four permanent locations. We have a train, advise and assist command based out of – Laghman, focused on the northeast part of Afghanistan. We've got one focus down in -- based out of Kandahar, focused on the southeastern portion.
We've got one out west, and that's focused -- or based in Herat, focused in the west. And then finally, we've got one up north, based in Mazar-e-Sharif, but focused on the largest north.
We also, then, have a couple of expeditionary advisory capabilities, so these are not permanent, but just based on what we have seen as a need, we've been able to put one of these capabilities down in Helmand to assist the core that's fighting down in Helmand. And then one is based out of Ghazni and it's really focused on the Paktiya, Paktika, Khost and Ghazni area.
So, that's kind of the core level. The final piece is the tactical level, and NATO does have the authority to have NATO's SOF capabilities and people out at a very tactical level, and literally going into the field with the Afghan SOF, be it on the MOD side, or on the MOI side with the police.
And obviously, I can't give you all the details on where those SOF elements work, but by and large, the -- each corps has a habitual relationship with a certain element of the SOF.
And so, on any given day, you can look and you will find SOF -- Afghan SOF out operating some place within the corps' area of responsibility. And then because of that, on any given day, it's possible that you could have a coalition SOF or a NATO SOF element out moving with that particular Afghan SOF piece.
But just to kind of give you a little sense of how frequent that is, about 75 percent of the Afghan SOF missions are conducted completely independent, with no coalition assistance whatsoever. Out of that remaining 25 percent, a percentage of that, we're not going into the field with them, we're just essentially helping them with the planning and intelligence and advising and those types of things.
And then again at times, we are sending coalition and NATO partners SOF out into the field with these Afghan SOF elements. And the way we kind of determine that is first off, based on the overall complexity of the mission. And second off, based on the payoff and how important we think a particular mission is. And then finally, based on the risk. And so, those are the types of factors that we use to try and determine whether or not NATO and partner SOF will go out with the Afghan SOF.
The final aspect -- and it's a bit of a hybrid -- but we also have a train, advise and assist command that's focused on the air. And they kind of span from ministerial, and determining how do you bring in more aircraft and what are the right frames to choose, all the way down to the tactical, where we have our airmen out helping train the Afghans on how to fly aircraft, how to employ their aircraft, what's the best approach to a helicopter landing zone, those types of things.
So, that really is, again, the train, advise and assist mission. It is a NATO mission, and the purpose of it is to build the sustainable security capability, so that the Afghans are ultimately able to not only defend their borders, but be able to address these trans-national and trans-regional terrorist organizations that base out of this area.
The second component of the U.S. mission is the U.S. unilateral counterterrorism mission, and we talked about this last time. And I think most of you are familiar with it. But again, we have long, for quite a while of course, had the mission to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida and prevent their use of Afghanistan as a launching pad from which to launch attacks against the West.
So, we have been pursuing Al Qaida. In January, of course, of this year, we were given authority to begin targeting Daesh, and we have been doing that aggressively.
As I think you're aware, I can't still get into a whole lot of discussion about the types of capabilities that we have, but suffice it to say we believe that we really have arguably the best counterterrorism forces on the planet that are here in Afghanistan.
They are aggressively pursuing these targets. I think the last time we talked, I gave you some statistics from the first of January until the first of March of just under about 100 counterterrorism strikes or so. Since that time, so during the month of April, we've taken just under 19 counterterrorism strikes. The majority of those have been focused on Daesh, but there have been still a few Al Qaida targets.
And I know that's probably still not entirely satisfying. My guess is you're probably looking for more information. At this point, though, we're still trying to figure out the best way to answer those information needs that I think you all have, while also trying to protect the capabilities that we have as well as the operations. And without trying to tip our hand really over to the enemy on where we're focused, and the percentage of work that we're focused on with that.
So, Jeff, let me go ahead and pause there. And again, I welcome everybody's questions.
CAPT. DAVIS: Sure. I think the first hand I saw was Kasim Ileri from -- Anadolu news agency in Turkey.
Q: Hi, general. This is Kasim Iseri with Anadolu news agency.
My question is related to the condolence payment that General Votel announced last week. Under the Resolute Support mission, was it the first time that you paid condolence payments to the, you know, for the civilian casualties? Or has there been any other cases where you paid condolence payments or reparation payments for the properties of civilians or the civilian lives that have been, you know, lost during the operations that you conducted?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yes, we have paid condolence payments before here in Afghanistan. And it's happened in different locations around the country as well as at different times.
Q: So is it possible if you could just provide us with a list? Or it may not be today, but later on, a list of the kinds of payments or, you know, in these cases before?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Sure. What I'd like to be able to do for you is essentially provide kind of some broad numbers for you. There is a privacy aspect to some of this and frankly, there's also a security aspect to these condolence payments, because oftentimes some of the recipients don't necessarily want to advertise that they have received some type of condolence payments. But we'll be happy to try and get you as much information as we possibly can about that.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next is Laurent.
Q: Hello, general. Laurent Barthelemy from Agence France Presse. Thanks for doing this.
I wanted to ask you, could you give us a sense of when General Nicholson will give his assessment on what U.S. forces will be needed next year?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Sure. Thank you for the question.
I think as you're probably aware, General Nicholson was given 90 days, or was told to execute a 90-day assessment. That 90-day assessment will be concluded, or that 90-day timeframe will be concluded the end of May, beginning of June. I don't have the exact date.
But General Nicholson does continue to work the assessment very aggressively and he will have it complete before the conclusion of the 90 days. So, again, I think you can anticipate that General Nicholson will begin formally sharing that with his chain of command by the end of May, beginning of June.
(CROSSTALK)
Q: Hey, sir, it's Carlo Munoz, the Washington Times.
I just have a few quick questions. One, I wanted to get your thoughts on reports coming out of Kabul that President Ghani is actually -- has picked General Habibi to be the defense minister, and Stanekzai will be moving over to NDS. I wanted to get your thoughts on that.
And also, how difficult has it been to coordinate missions with the ANDSF or coordinate operations with the ANDSF with this sort of power vacuum up top, not really having a defense minister to kind of wind things up?
And I have a follow up question regarding TAC North.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, sure. Thanks, Carlo.
Let me start with your second question first. To be honest with you, it hadn't been difficult at all. Minister Stanekzai, although he has clearly been in an acting capacity for quite a while, has been very effective. He has been very receptive to our outreach, and he is certainly -- spent a lot of time outreaching to us.
And so, to specifically answer you, there has not been any issue at all from the Resolute Support perspective on being able to engage with Minister Stanekzai, simply because he was in acting capacity.
In terms of the rumors, we -- I have heard several rumors about that, and that's been ongoing for a bit of time. Bottom line, is that does -- and that is an Afghan internal decision that they will make. We will obviously, gladly work with anybody that President Ghani chooses and that parliament does confirm.
But Minister Stanekzai has been a very strong partner, and he continues to do really some incredible things for the ministry of defense.
Q: And sir, just a quick follow up regarding TAC North. Wanted to kind of see how the command posts up there and those down in Kabul have sort have taken lessons learned from last September's attack in Kunduz, having the city briefly being recaptured by the Taliban.
What were some of the big sort of factors that kind of popped up to you as far why that happened and what sort of efforts you can take to sort of mitigate that.
And also, regarding activity in the north. Can you give me an update as far as what some of the activities have been regarding IMU in Badakhshan and some of the foreign fighters coming in. And also, wanted to see if there was any -- has there been any further interaction between U.S. or NATO forces with some of the militias belong to first Vice President Dostum and others up there?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, thanks, Carlo. Starting with your first question about the lessons learned by TAC North and by Kabul. And I think the real point on this speaks to the lessons learned by the ANDSF, and obviously, again, our role is to support them, and so, the lessons and the implementation of those lessons has really come with the ANDSF.
And I think their first big lesson is the need to get out of these defensive position and not wait for the enemy to attack them. I think their biggest lesson has been that they have got to take the fight to the enemy and they have got to aggressively project that combat power, and really, get the fight away from Kunduz.
And so, as you may be aware, Carlo, you know, into February, beginning of March, the ANDSF actually launched a nation-wide offensive called Operation Shafaq. They did not put a whole lot of press out about it, because frankly, they were still trying to work the peace issues, they were still trying to reach out to the Taliban, bring them to the negotiating table as part of a quadrilateral coordination group.
But once it became clear that the Taliban had said no to the negotiation, they launched their own offensive Op[eration] Amari and then they also launched that terrorist attack here in Kabul a few weeks ago. The government really started aggressively pushing it.
And so, even prior to the Taliban -- the recent attacks up in Kunduz, the ANDSF had been launching attacks up into northern Kunduz, and they have been hitting Taliban locations where they have been trying to mass and prepare for their offensive.
And so, we think that had some real effect. When the actual Taliban offensive started in Kunduz, and they started engaging the city, by and large, the ANDSF was pretty successful. They were able to defend Kunduz, although they did take some hits, and at times, they lost a little bit of terrain. They had been able to recover that terrain, and since that time, they've been able to clear the lines of communication again between Kunduz and Takhar, and some of the other locations out there.
So again, I think the biggest lesson that the ANDSF learned out of it was that they just can't sit and wait in the defense. They've got to aggressively start targeting the Taliban and push that combat power out further away from some of their main areas.
Your second question, IMU in Badakhshan -- obviously, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. We have not seen a tremendous amount of IMU influence up in the north recently. There was a time four or five years ago where that was much more of a concern.
Really, where we've seen the IMU migrate, and this has been, you know, really kind of back to Nangarhar, in an effort to kind of join Daesh. And so, we think one of the components that now make up Daesh are really disaffected IMU members. There are always sporadic reports, of course, that the IMU is of course trying to carve out some space up in the north so that they can project up into Uzbekistan. But we haven't seen a whole lot of that.
And then in terms of the question about, you know, the NATO and the work with Dostum and those types of things, you know, I really would refer you to the government of Afghanistan for that. Dostum has been up north. He's been working some of those elements. And we really don't have a direct tie to what he and those elements that are with him right now are doing.
Did that kind of answer the question, Carlo?
Q: Yes, sir.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next, we'll go to Paul McCleary from FP.
Q: Hey, general.
I was wondering if you could describe a little bit your assessment of how strong or how large Al Qaida is in Afghanistan, and ties that they have to the Taliban? Are they working with the Taliban, helping to train them or equip them? Or -- what -- how does it go back and forth there?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Thanks, Paul.
So, I don't -- I don't want to overstate this by any stretch of the imagination. And so let me give you a couple of thoughts, and then, you know, come back and -- and try and reconfirm that I've provided you some useful information.
You know, bottom line is there is still an Al Qaida presence here in Afghanistan. As you're probably well aware, there are two components of Al Qaida. There's first off core Al Qaida someplace in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region with Ayman Zawahiri still really running their global operations.
And then their newest franchise is Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS. We think both of those elements do have some type of presence here in Afghanistan. And when I say "some type of presence," probably in the range of 100 to 300 Al Qaida personnel. And again, that's a SWAG. And it's obviously not a very specific head count. But we think that they still maintain some type of presence up in Kunar. They occasionally are in Ghazni. And at times, we've seen them down in Kandahar as well, and a few other isolated locations.
In terms of the threat that they pose right now, by themselves we don't think that they pose a real threat, a real significant threat to the government of Afghanistan. But because we think that they are beginning to work more with Al Qaida, the threat that they pose is they can serve as an accelerant -- I'm sorry. Al Qaida, beginning to work more with Taliban, they can present a bit of an accelerant for the Taliban. So they can provide capabilities and skills and those types of things.
In terms of where we see them right now, again last fall, not long after Mullah Mansour kind of took control of the Taliban, Zawahiri, of course, came out and very publicly said that he swore allegiance to -- to Mullah Mansour and that piece.
Since that time, we have seen more interaction. We have seen them working more together. But the real thing and real reason why we continue to watch Al Qaida is, I think as we've all seen before, although they have been significantly diminished, they do have the ability to regenerate very quickly, and they still do have the ability to pose a threat.
And so what we want to do is be able to keep a very close eye on them and put constant pressure on that network, so that they are not able to regenerate and pose an additional threat.
So, again, a bit -- maybe a long winded answer, but to kind of summarize of it, we think the numbers of Al Qaida are small. We think that their specific threat to the government of Afghanistan is not huge. We think they are working more with the Taliban than they previously have.
But the real piece is, we are concerned that if you let them go unchecked, and you don't focus energy and effort, and you don't constantly pressure that network, they've got the ability to regrow.
Does that kind of answer the question, Paul?
Q: Yes. A quick follow-up. I mean, so would you characterize them as a growing threat? And you know, some of the airstrike, the CT strikes, you said that they hit Al Qaida.
How do you differentiate them from the Taliban in some of those strikes? Is there any blurring of lines?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah. So, the growing threat piece, I don't know that I would characterize them as a growing threat. I think in some ways, they certainly have the potential. And if we see them continue to work more closely with the Taliban, that is always a possibility.
I think their threat really remains about the same that we have seen over the last six months or so, where they are -- they are a threat, they do pose the potential again, to come up with some type of a surprise that we're not expecting.
But day in and day out, we don't think that they're the biggest threat based here in Afghanistan, but we do still want to focus a lot of attention on them.
And I -- I missed the second part of your question, Paul. Can you ask that one more time?
Q: Some of the CT strikes, I mean, is there -- is it difficult at times to differentiate between Al Qaida and the Taliban? I mean, are they working that closely?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, they are working closely in some instances. But by and large, I think as you know, Paul, we've got a number of intelligence capabilities that does allow us to identify those specific Al Qaida members.
And so, in terms of -- of separating the two, the bottom line is, not only does the Taliban work with Al Qaida, but they certainly work with the Haqqani network, they work with the LeT. They work with a number of organizations. And I think just a general problem, or a general challenge is these organizations just don't neatly divide into specific geographic locations or specific operations.
That's one of the things that -- that makes this situation somewhat opaque, is at times, we see all of these organizations working and working together, maybe sharing terrain, maybe conducting in operational acts together. Other times, they operate independently and conduct autonomous acts.
And then as sometimes we know, sometimes they'll fight. And again, you know, the examples of that, of course, are with Daesh and the Taliban, Al Qaida and Daesh. Those types of instances.
So, it can be a challenge to, you know, put your finger on exactly what you're looking at at a given time, but before we take any type of unilateral or U.S. counterterrorism strike, we do confirm, we do make sure that those are Al Qaida targets.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next to Lucas Tomlinson of Fox News.
Q: General, has the U.S. military changed its policy regarding bombing the Taliban in examples where they mass? And -- or is that something you are still considering?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Lucas. So, the policy has not changed. Right now, General Nicholson has got the ability to approve -- and the forces here have the ability to defend themselves as needed.
And so, if there is a Taliban organization that is either in direct contact with -- with U.S. forces who are actively out conducting their train, advise and assist mission or anything else, we do have the ability to defend ourselves and take those force protection strikes.
There are different types of force protection, if you will, at different levels. Obviously, I can't go into all of the rules of engagement; we simply don't want to, you know, tip the Taliban off as to when we can fire and when we can't fire.
But by and large, I think the command here is satisfied right now that we've got the ability to defend ourselves.
Does that kind of answer that, Lucas?
Q: I just have a follow-up. Why do you have to wait until you're attacked to be able to strike the Taliban?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, again, because the fact of the matter is we are not in -- necessarily in direct combat with the Taliban. What we are doing is we're providing the train, advise and assist to our Afghan partners. And so as we design these missions, we are not trying to go out and close with and destroy the enemy.
So it really becomes an Afghan role to be able to provide these fires. And so if you get to a point where U.S. forces or coalition forces, NATO forces as well, feel threatened, then they can defend themselves. But as a starting point and as a general rule, the expectation is that the Afghans are fighting the Taliban. We are here to help them. And the Afghans should be the ones that are -- that are conducting those engagements.
Q: U.S. forces are in Helmand right now. And have they seen any combat in the last few months?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yes. Again, going back to the initial discussion about the various levels where we're providing the train, advise and assist. So, we do have a U.S.-led train, advise and assist capability, you know, based out of the old Bastion Leatherneck compound. Those guys are by and large on the compound, and they are not finding themselves being placed in any type of combat situation that I'm aware of.
That said, we do have NATO and NATO partner nation SOF elements that are out maneuvering with Afghan SOF forces. And so while the mission for our guys is not combat, they have found themselves in combat situations where they have to defend themselves. They have to call for fire. They have to call for other enablers to help themselves -- to help them out.
Q: How many U.S. troops are in Helmand right now, General?
GEN. CLEVELAND: I don't have the specific number. The -- the element, the advisory, the expeditionary advisory capability is somewhere in the number of 700 to 800 down there. But there are also coalition forces down there. I don't have an actual head count on -- at my fingertips on how many Americans are in Helmand right now. But the expeditionary advisory capability is somewhere in the nature of 700 to 800.
Q: How has this banner poppy crop in Helmand impacted both the Taliban and your forces?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Too early to tell, Lucas, but we -- we are concerned about it. As I think most know, the poppy crop is really the engine that provides all the money that fuels the Taliban. And I think some would probably argue, you know, that Mullah Mansour, who again does not have really religious credentials, he really doesn't have military credentials -- his background with the Taliban was more the drug smuggling and the drug -- the opium production and the taxing of all that.
Clearly, there is a concern that with this very good poppy crop that they had this year, it is going to result in the Taliban being able to turn that into money for their efforts. And again, almost take them further down the path of being focused on the narcotic trade and the narcotics industry.
In the short term, you know, so Lucas, what we have seen over the last month-plus there's been a bit of a lull in the fighting in Helmand. And we think that's because so many people have been engaged in trying to harvest the poppies. As the harvest really concludes here, and we think it concludes really as soon as this week, we do expect to see an uptick in the Taliban efforts to attack the ANDSF.
And so in response to that, the ANDSF over the last month have been trying to do, as we described up north, they've been trying to conduct more offensive operations.
So I guess the short answer to your question is, number one, we are concerned about the potential windfall of money that can come into the Taliban based on this poppy crop. Number two, though, we have seen a bit of a lull in the fighting over the last month-plus, really because we think that a lot of the Taliban fighters have been out harvesting the poppy.
CAPT. DAVIS: Right. Next to Thomas Gibbons-Neff, from the Washington Post.
Q: Hi general, thanks for doing this. And I actually wanted to go back to the poppy crop that Lucas brought up.
More off that, I mean, having a banner year, 2015 wasn't that good because of the climate. This year appears to be a lot better down south.
What does that kind of say about the security situation down there? Does that mean that Taliban holds, you know, a majority of Helmand province, which we've seen in the past? Or is this an indication that the ANSF and the coalition have kind of abandoned going after the poppy crop that was a big part of our operations for the last X amount of years.
I just kind of want to see if that's something we're still actively pursuing, getting rid of the poppy trade, or we have just kind of let that go to the wayside?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Thomas, let me take the second part of the question first. So, you know, from a Resolute Support standpoint, we are not actively involved in dealing with the poppy crops, and again, you probably remember the ISAF days where that was a component of the campaign plan.
But right now, our real focus is indirect. And so, our role is to, again, help train, advise and assist the cohorts down there, the 215, as well as the police zone, and some of the other organs of the ministry of the interior to help advise them on best ways to go after it.
So, from a Resolute Standpoint, we're not actively engaged in countering the poppy crop.
That said, I wouldn't say we've quite abandoned. And as you -- I think you probably know from her firsthand experience, you know, Helmand is a big, vast area. Most of it is unpopulated. And so, as the government of Afghanistan really tries to identify priorities on what they are going to focus on, they've got to balance, you know, the cost of putting additional capabilities down, you know, further south into Helmand or into that Central Helmand area, versus some of the other things that they want to try and get accomplished.
In terms of -- and I think the first part of your question was the, you know, the majority of Helmand. I don't think the majority of Helmand is under the control of the Taliban. I think it would be safe or fair to say that a fairly, you know, a sizable portion, more than we would want of Helmand is absolutely contested.
And so, if you could kind of imagine an arc that really starts really in kind of central Marja, goes up north into the Nawzad area, and then cuts to the east, you know, southern Kajaki, north of Sangin -- those are the areas that the Taliban is really able to contest the most right now.
Now, the good news from our perspective, I think probably in part because we didn't see as much fighting in the last month, month and a half, the 215th Corps down there, they have been able -- starting in Lashkar Gah -- to clear that highway, 611, up along the eastern side of Helmand and going up into Sangin.
And so, we think that's a positive development; they've also had the ability now to pull some of their Kandaks off the line, go through retraining, and they're starting to reinsert those Kandaks back into the fight.
So, let me pause here, Thomas. Does that -- does that answer the question for you?
Q: Yeah, it does, and just kind of a broad follow-up.
I mean, what kind of combat power does the Taliban have these days? I feel like we've kind of just talked about them in generalities. Like, is -- you know, what kind of numbers do they have on the battlefield, and what can they kind of use for offensive operations?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Thomas. We -- I would tell you, we're still, in my view -- I don't, again, have real specific numbers. The generality that I would tell you is we typically believe there's probably about 30,000 or so Taliban fighters out there.
I know you've been following this story for a while, so you've probably heard that term before. We don't have any reason to think that it has significantly changed.
In terms of the combat power, you know, as we look at Operation Omari, you know, again, their initial focus was up in Kunduz. Although it's still very early in the fighting season, we're optimistic about the way that the ANDSF performed up there, and we think to some degree they had some success against the Taliban up there.
They really did push them out of the central Kunduz area and, as I mentioned earlier, they've been able to reopen several lines of communication.
As you look to the south, we think that that will be the next big Taliban push. We think it will come in Helmand. The other area right now where they're able to project some real combat power is in the Oruzgan area.
So we don't think Tarinkot is at serious risk right now. But really, the districts to the east and to the west Deh Rawud to the west in particular, the Taliban are contesting that. And again, there have been reporting in the press, you know, over the last few days about the road from Sha Wali Kot in Kandahar, up to Tarinkot as well, that that had been contested and that the Taliban had been able to pressure that area.
So those are the areas right now where we see the Taliban and where we think that they're -- they're going to head towards.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next to Idrees Ali from Reuters.
Q: General, the Pakistani military started its operation up in its north, you know, a few years ago. And there were reports at the time about the flow of fighters into Afghanistan as a result. Has that flow at all changed or stopped or increased?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, I don't know that -- I think that it has continued. And I, you know, you raised a really good point. One of the challenges that the ANDSF had at the beginning of 2015 was not only did we have a real reduction in the number of NATO forces here; not only did they then assume the security responsibility for themselves for the first time. But at the same time, the Pakistanis were conducting their offensive operations in the FATA. And that was pushing a number of really terrorists across the border on this side.
I think the real impact has been kind of the establishment of Daesh. And our view right now is that certainly a sizable portion of Daesh really is disaffected TTP that were kind of pushed across the border. Also, some disaffected IMU that again previously, you know, had their home in the FATA, and then were pushed across the border.
So we think that those are some of the impacts of those -- those Pakistani offensive operations.
As I think you're probably aware, too, you know, General Raheel recently announced that I think the Pakistani offensive operations have concluded in the FATA. And they certainly did make progress. But it does leave, again, this -- a bit of an ambiguous question as to whether or not those that were pushed across the border will try and migrate back into Pakistan.
Q: And are you doing anything to make sure that they don't cross back into Pakistan?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, what we're trying to do is, again, work with the ANDSF and switch them from a defensive posture where they were last year, to the offensive posture so that they can offensively really start targeting anybody that's a threat.
Now, all of that said, I think what everybody out here would believe is that in order to really solve the problems of Afghanistan, it's got to be a regional solution. And so there clearly has got to be a Pakistani role associated with what the Afghans are doing. And there is -- there is coordination between the two militaries, and Resolute Support does also engage with the Pak mil.
But that said, there's probably still work to be done to better influence some of those terrorists that really live in that -- that border area.
Q: Just the one last follow-up. I mean, specifically talking about the Haqqani Network, how strong are they along the border region?
GEN. CLEVELAND: You know, we think the Haqqani Network is pretty strong. They historically have been the most lethal and, frankly, the most competent terrorist organization in this area. The P2K area -– again Paktiya, Paktika, Khost -- clearly has been Haqqani's traditional area where they have -- they have done the most fighting, if you will. That transitions of course over into North Waziristan where we believe a lot of the Haqqani leadership was based.
The other aspect is that the Haqqanis, of course, have historically been responsible for the high profile attacks that have hit Kabul, that have hit Jalalabad, that have hit some of the other major urban areas. And the concern is that they're lethal, they're effective but they're also indiscriminate.
And they don't appear to have any qualms or compunctions about, you know, really killing innocent children, men, women and just setting off these bombs as we saw with this Kabul high-profile attack a few weeks ago.
The final component, as you're probably aware, Siraj Haqqani, has been named the number two for the Taliban. And we think that he is increasing really, his day-to-day role in terms of conducting Taliban military operations. And we think that he is trying to exert more influence really, on the leadership with some of these shadow governors in some of these other places.
So, the relationship between the Haqqani and the Taliban, again, has always existed. At times, the Haqqanis have been autonomous than others. But we do have concerns about the Haqqanis branching out from their traditional area and then focus more on these high profile attacks.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next to Jamie McIntyre, the Washington Examiner.
Q: General, I wanted to go back to what you said at the very opening of your comments. One thing that we learned from the CENTCOM investigation into the mistaken attack on hospital in Kunduz is that the special operations commander on the ground invoked his force protection authority to call in a strike that the investigators later concluded was really more offensive in nature, not a defensive strike.
Because we don't have an accounting of air strikes in Afghanistan the way we do in Iraq, how do we know that this kind of occurrence isn't more common? That U.S. commanders essentially bend the rules a little bit to try to help their Afghan partners.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yes, Jamie, thanks again for the question. And I did hear you ask General Votel a similar question. And I think his response probably is the authoritative response, which is, you know, he wouldn't allow it as his level.
I think General Nicholson absolutely feels the same way, that if he had a sense or a suspicion that commanders were abusing that force protection authority, he would jump in immediately. And at this point, I don't believe that he had any sense at all that commanders are abusing that and really trying to get around the rules of engagement.
Q: One quick follow-up. You earlier made again a difference between U.S. troops being in combat and in a combat situation. Is that an important nuance to understand or is that in some ways, a difference without much of a distinction?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, I think the overall topic is important and I'm sure you're all very familiar with the Secretary's comments last week and the Chairman's comments in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. And so, that really still stands as the authoritative description of what you're describing.
As it pertains Afghanistan, in the course of conducting these train, advise and assist missions, as well as in the course of conducting counterterrorism missions, U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, do find themselves in combat. But the real key, or the real change -- it may be a nuance. It may be more significant and I would really defer to you that I kind of characterize that.
But the real the distinction is, in 2014, before the conclusion of ISAF, really the com -- U.S. forces were in a combat role. Their mission was close with and destroy the enemy. So they would go after objectives and they would go after specific targets.
Starting in '15, we moved out of that combat role. And so the primary mission for us here is the train, advise and assist and then the counterterrorism mission.
Again, there are times where our forces, while conducting those missions do end up in combat situations. But the overall mission remains the same, which is to train, advise and assist the Afghans and then conduct these counterterrorism missions.
Q: Follow-up. You mentioned that General Nicholson would be submitting his recommendations end of the month or early next month. Is there any consideration of requesting additional authority to provide close air support for the Afghan partners who are confronting the Taliban, similar to what's going on in Iraq, which would be a change of authority closer to what was happening back in 2014?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Jamie. So, General Nicholson, frankly, his assessment is pretty broad and comprehensive.
It -- as you would expect, it's covering everything from the current situation and the threat environment, to the mission he has been given, to the current operations and operations plans, and into the resources, to include authority.
So, he is really looking at all of that as one package. And then, once he comes to his conclusions, he'll either decide to make recommendations or not.
So, that is -- frankly, Jamie, it's still to be determined at this point.
CAPT. DAVIS: Next to Courtney Kube, NBC News.
Q: Hi, general, you've pretty much covered all of my questions, but I'll ask one more numbers one for you.
What's the latest update on the number of ISIS fighters believed to be in Afghanistan?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Courtney. It's very consistent with what we discussed last month.
And unfortunately, I still don't have a real good, specific number, but we think the number is, again, somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000. We think it is on the lower end, because I think, under any standard and looking at it objectively, the operations in Nangarhar have been successful.
And so, the ANDSF has put a lot of pressure on Daesh, as -- and the U.S. unilateral counterterrorism strikes have put some pressure on Daesh, too.
So, we think it's probably between 1,000 and 3,000, probably closer to 1,000. But the real way we look at them again, and really, kind of the metric we try and track is how much terrain do they hold. It is, as I think you know, that's -- of course, one of the fundamental tenets of Daesh is holding terrain to support their idea of this caliphate.
And right now, we think from a terrain standpoint, again, probably present within two to three districts within Nangarhar. Could be less. We have seen some effort by Daesh to move up into Kunar to the north, or perhaps down to Ghazni in the south.
We don't think, though, that's because they've got extra capacity and they're trying to expand. We think that's really because they've been put under pressure in Nangarhar.
Q: And then, the CT strikes -- the airstrikes that the U.S. has the authority to take, those don't apply to the Haqqani network, do they?
GEN. CLEVELAND: That's correct; they do not.
Obviously, if a member of the Haqqani network is -- is posing a threat to coalition or specifically, U.S. forces, we do have the ability, again, to defend ourselves. But we do not have the ability or the authority to target Haqqanis, in the same way that we can target Al Qaida and Daesh.
Q: Just again, you know, you've laid out these pictures of these grounds today, you know, 30,000 Taliban and Haqqani being the biggest threat right now, and then these relatively small numbers of Al Qaida and ISIS -- and those are the only two groups that you can target with counter terror strikes from the air, when we all know that -- as General Dunford even reiterated on his recent trip that the Afghan air force just really doesn't have the ability to conduct much.
You know, if one of the lessons learned out of Kunduz was that the Afghans need to more offensive or more aggressive against the Taliban, don't we think there's a strong argument to be made that the U.S. could help with that by being able to make -- to do those counter -- those airstrikes, and provide counter terror airstrikes against the Taliban?
I mean, wouldn't that -- I guess I -- it doesn't -- it seems like this cognitive dissonance between why you can take strikes against 100 to 300 Al Qaida and not 30,000 Taliban, especially if they're partnering with Al Qaida now in some capacity.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, sure, Courtney. And thank you again, for the question.
I think the fundamental difference is -- and overall, you're really referencing a larger policy question that, of course, we don't determine out here.
So I think you can probably get your best answer, you know, from -- from the beltway there.
But I think really the fundamental difference is that Al Qaida and Daesh, in particular, provide this transnational threat to the West and to the homeland specifically. And so the U.S. CT mission is really out here to prevent strikes against the homeland. And again, we know that obviously these organizations have the ability to plan. They have the ability to execute, and they have the ability to potentially push those threats towards the West and specifically the U.S. homeland.
So, when you look at some of the other organizations -- again, Taliban, the Haqqani Network -- regardless of how lethal or dangerous they are, probably don't pose the same type of threat to the U.S. homeland that you would find from Al Qaida and Daesh. And so therefore, we're focused on Al Qaida and Daesh at this point.
Q: Thank you.
CAPT. DAVIS: (inaudible) -- Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg.
Q: (inaudible) -- what's the status of the A-29 Super Tucano? When do they enter combat? I know a number of them -- the first one was delivered in December. When do they enter combat?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Tony. So there were two phases of delivery. Phase one was four A-29s delivered in early January. They achieved their initial operating capability on the first of April. So they are now being employed by the Afghans, and they are providing close-air support.
The second group of four A-29s arrived right about the same time, beginning of April timeframe that the first four were going online. And so they are now going through their paces and they are going through their training effort right now. We expect to see them become operational and we don't have a hard date for it, but we think probably the June timeframe. But I would refer you to the -- to the Ministry of Defense here and the Afghan air force and they can give you more specifics on that.
Q: (inaudible) -- aggressively has the Pakistan military targeted the Haqqani Network? There's questions among lawmakers here in Washington who are linking additional F-16 sales to Pakistan more aggressively targeting Haqqani. What is your professional judgment right now of how hard Pakistan has actually been targeting this lethal group?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, Tony. Again, our focus really is on Afghanistan. And so, there are probably others at U.S. CENTCOM or there in the Pentagon that can probably give you a more coherent and authoritative answer, if you will, on what the Pakistani military has been doing against the Haqqanis.
That said, of course, we still believe that the Pakistanis have a huge role in being in the success of certainly Afghanistan and this region. And so we absolutely do believe that the Pakistanis, you know, need to be engaging and targeting any of these terrorist organizations. But for the specifics, I would refer you to U.S. CENTCOM or really to those in the Pentagon.
Q: As the most lethal of the groups, one could infer that the Pakistanis aren't aggressively targeting them. Is that illogical? Or does that make sense?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, I -- again, I just -- our real focus and our real area of expertise, if you will, is what's happening on this side of the border. There's no doubt that the Haqqanis have historically had their leadership across the border in the FATA. And there's no doubt that they've been able to conduct operations from there. But it really is up for the Pakistanis, as has been stated several times, to be able to take some type of action against it. And I just don't have a good sense or a good sight picture, if you will, on exactly what the Pakistanis are doing against the Haqqani Network.
CAPT. DAVIS: (inaudible) -- next to Jeff from Voice of America.
Q: General, thanks very much.
I wonder if we could bring this back to the poppy crop, and also Islamic state. There have been some reports this past week out of Nangarhar that Islamic state has said they're trying to profit now from the poppy crop -- (inaudible) -- targeting it, burning some of the crops, trying to arrest or take into custody some of the farmers who've been growing it.
What have you seen in terms of the -- how much of that has taken place? The reason for the shift, and also, what type of impact is that having in that area? Is it hurting the Taliban or other groups?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Yeah, I saw the same press reporting that Daesh was beginning to burn poppy crops and arrest others. I don't -- I have not seen any independent reporting, so I -- this is not going to answer your question. And it's not that I'm trying to hide something. We just have not seen a lot of evidence in that. Or I have not seen a whole lot of evidence of that.
So I don't really have a good sense as to whether or not it's happening. If it is happening, why it's happening and, and really what the impact is on the larger crop.
CAPT. DAVIS: Yes, I believe we have a follow-up from Kasim.
Q: Thanks. I want to have two follow-ups with respect to questions asked by Lucas and also by Courtney again. You said that -- while you're not directly targeting, you know, Taliban and other groups, but you're targeting ISIS or Daesh over there.
How -- you know, we know that with respect to the Resolute Support mission, the role of the United States forces have changed over that. So you're not directing the command, control and so on. But how do you situate targeting Daesh in the southern part of the country, into a Resolute Support mission?
Because, you know, yes.
GEN. CLEVELAND: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but again, it's hard to hear Daesh is not a part of the Resolute Support mission. So, and again, it can be a little bit nuanced and confusing. But the Resolute Support mission is a NATO mission. And the NATO mission, again, is to train, advise and assist.
The targeting of Daesh falls under the U.S. Unilateral Counterterrorism mission, and so Resolute Support does not target Daesh. The United States, under this U.S. unilateral mission, does target Daesh.
Q: And the other question, with respect to Pakistan, to what extent does the U.S. support or cooperate with the Pakistanis when they target Haqqani network or the other terrorist groups in the northern part of the country, bordering with Afghanistan?
GEN. CLEVELAND: Well, of course, I really can't get into any real detail on kind of the intelligence or information sharing agreements, if you will, between be it the U.S. and the Pakistanis, or the Afghans and the Pakistanis. But bottom line is we do maintain a relationship and an open line for a lack of a better term to the Pakistan mil.
We do try and keep each other informed of the various operations that are ongoing. But, unfortunately, I just can't give you a whole lot of detail about the level and depth of the intelligence sharing.
CAPT. DAVIS: Anyone else? Last call?
Thank you general. We appreciate you taking the time to see us today and we look forward to seeing you again.
GEN. CLEVELAND: Okay. Thanks again Jeff.
And for everybody else, I do appreciate your time and if we can help you out or maybe provide some additional information, please feel free to reach out to us and we'll be happy to respond as quickly as we can. Have a great weekend.